Negotiations in the real world have many features which tend to be ignored in policy modeling. They are often multilateral, involving many negotiating parties with preferences over outcomes that can differ substantially. They are also often multidimensional, in the sense that several policies are negotiated over simultaneously. Trade negotiations are a prime example, as are negotiations over environmental policies to abate carbon dioxide. We demonstrate how one can formally model this type of negotiation process. We use a policy-oriented computable general equilibrium model to generate preference functions which are then used in a formal multilateral bargaining game. The case study is to climate change policy, but the main contribution is to demonstrate how one can integrate formal economic models of the impacts of policies with formal bargaining models of the negotiations over those policies.
INTRODUCTION
One fundamental problem in multilateral negotiations over CO 2 abatement policies is the existence of conflicting interests because those policies are public goods.
Every country is better off if abatement of CO 2 emissions take place in all countries than if no abatement is undertaken. However, given that other countries are undertaking abatement the welfare of each country is higher if it does not undertake any abatement.
Moreover, unilateral abatement policies are not effective.
1 A possible solution requires a negotiation setting in which any policy proposal can only be considered if proposed by a majority of the countries involved. In other words, if coalition formation in proposals and voting is accepted there may be less of a problem of individual free riding, since the proposal represents the interests of its proposers.
We evaluate one such institution for multilateral bargaining (MB) in several stages. First, using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model (International Impact Assessment Model -IIAM) developed by Bernstein, Montgomery, and Rutherford (1997) , we generate estimates of the welfare effects for OECD countries from several CO 2 abatement policies. An abatement policy consists of a quantity reduction in CO 2 emissions and a time limit. Second, using the welfare changes calculated in the first stage, we estimate political preference functions for each country.
A political preference function specifies how the welfare of each country varies as the abatement policy moves away from the ideal vector of that country. Third, using the estimated preference functions we numerically evaluate the multilateral bargaining institution under alternative specifications with respect to the set of countries undertaking abatement, the trade regime allowed, and the presence or absence of a coordinating authority in the negotiations.
WELFARE IMPACTS OF ABATEMENT POLICIES
The IIAM is a dynamic, general equilibrium, multiregional, trade model with 25 regions. The model is formulated as two separate but compatible general equilibrium models. The first is a multiregional trade model that provides an approximation of the changes in international terms of trade that could result from CO 2 restrictions imposed on a subset of countries. The second is a general purpose small open economy model that is used to study the implications of changes in international prices for particular countries. The CO 2 restrictions to be evaluated consist of relative abatement in CO 2 emissions relative to 1992 levels, and a time limit to accomplish the required reduction.
We simulated nine different scenarios shown in Table 1 . For simplicity, the abatement year is referred to as the "breadth" of the abatement policy and the percent of abatement is referred to as the "depth" of the abatement policy. The policy instrument considered in the IIAM are carbon emission permits that entitle the permit owner to release a certain amount of CO 2 during some time period.
Restricting the amount of available permits allows governments to reduce the amount of CO 2 released. The permits may either be used by the country owning them, or they may be sold to another country that is carbon restricted. Therefore, we evaluate the welfare impacts 2 of each of the nine scenarios in Table 1 
ESTIMATION OF PREFERENCES
We assume that countries have Euclidean preferences over the policy space. In other words, we assume that as the policy vector that is implemented moves away from an ideal point in the policy space, the utility of each country/region i, U(i), declines at a constant rate. The following equation shows the specific functional form assumed for each country/region preference function:
with i=1, 2, ..., 7, and j= breadth, depth.
U(i) is the utility for country i, measured as the percentage change in the country's equivalent variation at 1992 dollars, X(j) 4 is the breadth and depth of any policy vector. Preference functions are characterized by three parameters. The breadth and depth of the most preferred policy vector, A(i,j); the utility level attained by each country/region at the most preferred policy vector, α(i); and the rate of decline of utility as the policy vector moves away from the ideal point, β(i). Estimation of the parameters for each country/region was formulated with GAMS software and solvers described in Brooke et al. (1992) . 5 OECD member countries are grouped in seven sets: Australia (AUS), New Zealand (NZL), Japan (JPN), Canada (CAN), USA, European Union (EU -includes 12 countries), and EU3 (including Austria, Finland, and Sweden).
One problem with implementing multilateral negotiations over abatement policies consists of establishing a credible default outcome in the event that negotiations fail. Moreover, countries in the negotiations need to expect some benefit from CO 2 abatement policies, otherwise no agreement would be preferred to any agreement. We assume that if negotiations fail, countries suffer no welfare loss or gain, so that the welfare change is zero. Behind this is the assumption that global warming would induce no welfare change, and, as a corollary, the assumption that no welfare gain occurs because of reduced carbon emissions. However, developed countries have agreed to abate carbon emissions. By doing so, they implicitly attribute some benefit to abatement of carbon emissions. In order for the countries at the negotiation table to have any incentive to reach an agreement, the perceived welfare from a possible agreement must exceed the welfare they enjoy if negotiations fail. We therefore assume that benefits of abatement are 1% of welfare in every country. This ensures that each country in our MB negotiation perceives some net benefit from participating; they may still experience very different welfare costs from the alternative proposals. Hence one unit is added to the intercept of each country's utility function, as shown in Tables 2 and 3 .
We estimate four sets of preferences by varying the set of countries with CO 2 emission constraints and the trade regime in emission permits. The first two sets of preference function estimates correspond to the case of abatement by all OECD members assuming No trade and Trade in emission permits, respectively ( Table 2 ). The 5 Assuming Euclidean preferences, we estimate α(i), β(i) and A(i,j) for each i using the welfare of i for all nine scenarios in Table 1 . The criteria used in the estimation was to minimize the sum of squared residuals. Given the nonlinear nature of the utility function the estimation entailed simple non-linear optimization algorithms. Details are provided in Pinto (1998 The estimated parameters of the utility function for each country are invariant to changes in the trade regime, apart from AUS. However, there is some variation across country/region. AUS is the country with highest utility at its optimal policy vector. NZL is the country with lowest utility at the optimal policy vector. Examining the rate of decline of utility as the policy vector moves away from the ideal point of each country, we conclude that NZL is the country most affected by abatement policies, followed by CAN and the USA. AUS is the country with lowest welfare cost of abatement. Table 3 presents the estimated ideal points of OECD members in terms of the depth and breadth of the abatement policy when only the USA and the EU are abating or financing CO 2 emissions abatement. As shown in Table 3 and Figure 2 , if trade in emission permits is not allowed the USA and the EU prefer to abate less and later than the other countries. Pinto (1998; chapter 5) explains this result as follows, based on a detailed review of the underlying simulations results. As some OECD countries abate, they lose competitiveness relative to other countries, mainly other OECD countries.
Thus, the tighter the cut in emissions by the USA and the EU, the higher the welfare of other OECD members and the lower the welfare of the abating countries. Having completed the process of preference functions estimation, we can now proceed to analyze the MB institution.
THE MULTILATERAL BARGAINING MODEL
The MB game developed by Rausser and Simon (1991) can be viewed as an extension of Rubinstein's (1982) alternating offer bargaining game. In Rubinstein's model, two players bargain over the division of a pie of size one. In the first round, one of the players, the proposer, offers a division of the pie to the other player. In the second round, this other player either accepts or rejects the proposed division. If he accepts then the game ends with the proposed division being implemented. If he rejects it is his turn to propose an alternative division. In Rubinstein's game the bargaining can go on for an infinite number of periods.
Rausser and Simon's (1991) formulation differs in two critical respects from Rubinstein's formulation: they incorporate multiple players and multidimensional issue spaces. The MB game consists of T rounds. Each round is divided into three subperiods.
In the first subperiod nature chooses a player to be a proposer according to a prespecified vector of strictly positive "access probabilities". 6 In the second subperiod the proposer announces a coalition, 7 of which he must be a member, and a policy vector that is feasible 8 for that coalition. In the third subperiod the remaining members of the proposed coalition each choose whether to accept or reject the proposed policy vector. If all accept, the game ends. If at least one member rejects, the next period begins and a new proposer is selected. If the last round of the game is reached without any agreement on a policy vector, a pre-specified disagreement outcome is implemented. Therefore, the purpose of the negotiation is to select a policy vector from a set of possible vectors and a voting coalition from a set of admissible coalitions.
An admissible coalition is a subset of the players that has the authority to impose a policy choice on the whole group. In a majority rule bargaining game, an admissible coalition must contain a majority of the players. 9 In this particular application we assume that an admissible coalition must contain one specific player referred to as the central player.
The central player is distinguished from the other players by three characteristics. First, the central player must be in every coalition. Second, the utility function of the central player must be a function of the utility of the other players with the utility of each player receiving a strictly positive weight. 10 Third, the central player 6 By access probabilities we mean the probability of a particular player being called to propose a policy vector and a voting coalition. 7 A coalition is a set of players. 8 A feasible policy vector is one that involves an abatement policy that all members of the proposed voting coalition would vote for in comparison to the disagreement outcome. 9 A coalition is admissible if it contains a majority of the players, assuming all players have the same voting power. Alternatively, if players have different voting power such as in the EU, a coalition is admissible if it consists of a subset of players that have a majority of the voting power. 10 Specifically, we assume a linear utility function for the government. The arguments of this utility function are the utility of each country involved in the game. That is, the utility of each country is a perfect substitute for the utility of other countries.
must have some positive access probability. The existence of a central player guarantees a solution.
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The equilibrium concept usually employed in this kind of game is subgame perfection. A subgame perfect equilibrium for a game is a strategy profile with the property that at every sub-period of the game each player's choice is optimal given the strategies specified by the other players. This concept is not sufficiently discriminating since the MB game has many subgame perfect equilibria, some of which have undesirable characteristics. For any game in which at least two players are required for agreement, any policy that is weakly preferred by all players relative to the disagreement outcome can be implemented with certainty as a subgame perfect equilibrium. Several refinements eliminate these equilibria, and Rausser and Simon (1991) specifically employ the properness equilibrium originally developed by Myerson (1987) .
APPLYING THE MB MODEL
In our application the players are the seven regions/countries constituting the OECD. These countries are modeled as negotiating over the depth and the breadth of the abatement policy. Therefore, countries in the negotiation choose a policy vector and a coalition of countries willing to vote for the proposal. The policy vector consists of a specific emission cut and a specific year to attain it. The proposed coalition must be an admissible coalition as previously defined. The central player is, in our application, designated by the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC), which is the organization currently supervising the negotiations. It seems reasonable to assume that 11 The solution is in general deterministic, and is in the core of the corresponding cooperative game. In the context of the MB institution, a vector x is in the core if it is feasible for some coalition and if, for every coalition C, there is no feasible vector that is weakly preferred to x by each member of C and strictly preferred by one member. Rausser and Simon (1991) present the formal model along with proofs of those results. They also discuss some generalizations of the model not used in this application (e.g., the IPCC exerts some influence over climate change negotiations. We analyze the role that the IPCC must exert in the negotiations so that the negotiating parties reach an agreement. This evaluation is undertaken by varying the IPCC's access probability and voting power. emissions. For each abating coalition we additionally consider the influence of the IPCC on the speed and outcome of the negotiations. We also consider the effect of a unanimity rule when the abating coalition is formed by the USA and the EU. Table 5 shows the outcomes of these simulations using the preferences reported in the first set of Tables 2 and 3 .
The first column in Table 5 Tables 5 and 6 for each player may be equivalent to other voting coalitions that generate the same payoff to the proposing player. However, only one of the equivalent voting coalitions is reported. For more detailed information see Pinto (1998, p.253) . 13 The proposed policies and the resulting payoffs reported in Table 5 refer to the last round of negotiations. The first set of numbers in Table 5 show the results of the MB game assuming that the IPCC takes no role at the negotiations. Specifically, the IPCC has no access to make proposals (its access probability is zero), and it has no voting power. In practical terms, this corresponds to a situation where the IPCC is absent from negotiations. 14 The game reaches equilibrium after 5 rounds of negotiations, characterized by all players
proposing an emission cut of 10% by about the year 2006.9. The simulation reported in the second set of results in Table 5 differ from the previous one in terms of the role attributed to the IPCC. Specifically, the IPCC is given the same access probability and voting power as the other parties in the negotiations. Comparison of the two sets of results shows that the presence of the IPCC in this setting has no influence on the policy vector agreed or on the speed of the negotiations. The voting coalition proposed by each country/region is also invariant with the presence/absence of the IPCC.
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These results refer to situations in which the negotiating countries/regions have compatible interests, in the sense that their preferences are for abatement policies involving as little abatement as possible, and as late as possible, despite some regional variation. A more interesting case consists in analyzing situations of conflicting interest.
An example of such a situation would be imposing carbon restrictions on only some of the negotiating countries/regions (the last three sets of results in Table 5 refer to such situations).
Assuming that only the USA and the EU are undertaking abatement activities, Table 5 shows that inclusion of the IPCC in the negotiations increases the speed of negotiations, but that the number of rounds required to reach an agreement is significantly higher than in the case where all parties were carbon constrained.
Considering the policy vector proposed by each country/region in the last round, the negotiated breadth is very similar in both situations, but the depth is in general smaller when the IPCC is present in the negotiations. In fact, differences in the depth of To test the robustness of the MB institution to different decision rules we simulate negotiations under a unanimity rule. The last set of results in Table 5 show that requiring unanimity leads to higher emission abatement than in any of the situations analyzed. Moreover, the agreement is reached after only four rounds of negotiations.
Since all players must agree with the policy vector proposed, the range of policy proposals is, in a sense, reduced. Non-abating countries must satisfy abating countries' preferences and abating countries must satisfy non-abating countries' preferences.
MB GAME WITH TRADE IN EMISSION PERMITS
Trade in emission permits allows countries more flexibility to achieve their emission targets. Each country can issue the amount of carbon emission permits according to a given target and then firms or governments can trade these permits in a world market. As stressed in Pinto (1998) , if countries are to choose between a regime of non-tradable emission permits and a regime of tradable emission permits across regions, all countries prefer the latter. In this section we evaluate the MB game assuming that countries can trade emission permits in a world market. The preference function estimates used in the simulations performed in this section are the second blocks of Tables 2 and 3 .
As can be seen from the negotiation outcomes reported in Table 6 , we analyze four different specifications of the MB institution that vary the members of the abating coalition and the presence of the IPCC. The first set of results in Table 6 refer to the situation characterized by the absence of the IPCC and with the presence of all members of the OECD in the abating coalition. The second set refers to a situation with the same abating coalition but with the presence of the IPCC at the negotiations.
By comparing the two situations we conclude that the presence of the IPCC only affects the number of rounds needed to reach an agreement. Specifically, if the IPCC is present at the negotiations only two rounds are necessary to reach an agreement.
Although the voting coalition proposed by the E_U and the EU3 reported in Table 6 is different, in fact both countries are indifferent between the voting coalition they propose when the IPCC is present and when it is absent. If the abating coalition is composed of the USA and the EU the presence of the IPCC is significant on the speed of agreement (these results are in the third and fourth set of results in Table 6 ). Comparing the two sets of results we conclude that the presence of the IPCC significantly decreases the number of negotiation rounds needed to reach an agreement.
If the abating coalition is formed by the USA and the EU, the agreed policy 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We propose and demonstrate the use of computable general equilibrium models and game theory to model multilateral economic policies.
The process of modeling and evaluating the effects of multilateral policies with economic implications was illustrated in the context of climate change. Specifically, using a CGE model we assessed the welfare effects of alternative carbon abatement policies in order to estimate political preference functions of OECD member countries.
We found that if all OECD members are carbon constrained, the trade regime is unimportant and countries have very similar preferences regarding the abatement policy. On the other hand, if only some countries are carbon constrained, preferences regarding abatement policies vary across countries/regions.
Using these estimated preferences, we simulated several negotiating scenarios.
The negotiations are over the amount of abatement and the time limit to attain the required reduction in CO 2 emissions and over a voting coalition willing to approve the proposed policy. If all negotiating countries are carbon constrained, the number of rounds necessary to reach an equilibrium is small, and the IPCC has no significant effect on the speed of the agreement or on the policy agreed. However, if only some countries are carbon constrained, then the interests of the negotiating parties are not compatible. In other words, carbon constrained countries prefer lower and later abatements while non-abating countries prefer higher and sooner abatements. Under this specification, negotiations take longer to converge to an equilibrium. In the case of USA/EU abatement with trade in emission permits, the equilibrium policy and voting coalition is not unique. The solution of the MB institution in such situation depends on the country making the proposal being in the abating coalition or not. Under these circumstances, inclusion of the IPCC leads to faster agreements.
One limitation of these analyses results from the assumption that benefits of abatement are constant across the policy scenarios evaluated. One valuable extension would be to modify the IIAM model so as to compare the cost effectiveness across abating coalitions maintaining the same global abatement target, as in Harrison and Rutherford (1998) . In particular, countries would be committed to undertake some level of global abatement. That is, instead of being committed to reduce their own emissions by a given percentage they would be committed to reduce global emissions by a given percentage. The main difference between these two types of commitment is that under the latter carbon-constrained countries would have to compensate for any carbon leakage. Under this alternative, abatement benefits would be constant across coalitions subject to the same global emission target since the same environmental target would be met, by assumption. Thus, a direct comparison of welfare costs would be possible.
